China: The Elusive Market For US Technology Companies

China ranks as the world’s largest country by population, second in annual GDP and is likely to rank second in terms of total Information Technology (IT) spending in 2013 at about 10% of global IT spending.  It is estimated by industry analysts that China will grow its IT spending by close to 10% per year over the next decade as IT spending only represents about 2% of its GDP which is less than half the level of more developed countries like the US.  While China represents a large and rapidly growing market for US technology companies, the path to success in this market has proven difficult and sometimes impossible due to indigenous suppliers, intellectual property protection and software piracy issues, pricing challenges and other unique market conditions.  China has also grown its own global technology powerhouses in certain industries like communications equipment and personal computers, materially impacting the competitive dynamics for traditional US and European players in not just the China market, but also the entire global technology market.  Finally, China has also developed its own Internet powerhouse companies that have made it difficult for leading US Internet and social media companies to succeed in China.   Is China “friend or foe” for US technology companies, and has history provided technology companies any lessons on sustainable business practices that can be applied to the Chinese market?

 

Over the past three decades there have been many failures and lackluster successes by US technology companies seeking to enter and profitably grow in the China market.  A high profile example was Google, who decided to exit the China market in 2010 after only about five years of formally entering the market with its own development center in China (and an earlier failed attempt to acquire local competitor Baidu).  Baidu’s market share only increased from the mid 40s to the mid 60s in the five years following Google’s entry, which was significantly higher than the 30%-35% share that Google was able to achieve during that period.   While Google pointed to censorship issues as the main driver to leaving the China market, it was also clearly the case that Baidu did a better job of understating the local market (e.g. Mandarin language searches, music downloads that “crossed” the line on piracy issues etc.) which contributed to Google not being a success in the search engine market in China as it was in other markets around the world. 

 

Google was not the only US Internet giant that failed to achieve its goals in China, as Yahoo and EBay entered and exited as well.  Both used acquisitions of Chinese-based companies as part of their respective entry strategies, but Yahoo could not effectively compete with Baidu in the search market while eBay lost out to Taobao.com (owned by Alibaba) in the online auction market.  In both cases, both eBay and Yahoo did not do a good job in understanding the local China market nuances for search and on-line auctions. Yahoo at least made a financially smart decision to exit the market and invest in competitor Alibaba, which took over its Internet operations.  It is estimated by some analysts that Yahoo’s investment in Alibaba is worth 50% or much more of Yahoo’s current market capitalization. 

 

In all the cases above, US Internet companies stopped their efforts in China within about a five-year period.  While the Internet may move a rapid pace of innovation, business success in China, especially in the technology sector, takes a much longer-term commitment.  Google’s former CEO, Eric Schmidt, initially stated that China had 5,000 years of history and Google would have 5,000 years of patience in China.  As it turned out, Google, eBay and Yahoo only had about 5 years of loss-making patience.  Unfortunately for US Internet companies, China continues to grow much faster than the US in on-line sales and is likely to surpass the US within the next couple of years as evident by China “crushing” the on-lines sales record on November 11th, 2013 as part of China’s annual “Single’s Day” national promotion.

 

The concern over protecting IP and pirating software has been an obstacle for US technology companies seeking to expand their sales business operations in China.  Taking legal action by US technology companies has often backfired.  For example, Cisco Systems’ first-ever corporate lawsuit on IP was against Chinese based Huawei in 2003, which allegedly copied Cisco manuals and software code.  Cisco dropped the lawsuit in 2004 after remedy actions by Huawei, but in my view the lawsuit cost Cisco more in reputational risk than any benefit from the lawsuit.  To this day, China represents less than 5% of Cisco’s total sales in China and the company often highlights China as being “unique” for Cisco when discussing its sub-par performance in the country.  Microsoft has faced software piracy issues around Windows for PCs in China since the company entered the market in 1992.   The issue of piracy in China is still an issue today for Microsoft as evidenced from its recent earnings call where it disclosed for the first time the performance of its Windows business with and without China (i.e. Windows is declining more rapidly in China than the rest of the world).  Microsoft is hoping to reduce piracy of software by selling cloud-based versions of its consumer software, thus, hopefully eliminating over time the availability of pirated software disks sold on the streets.

 

Cisco’s problems in China have intensified recently as the company’s orders from China fell 18% in its recent October 2013 quarter. Cisco is likely feeling the backlash of Huawei’s years of struggle and ultimate failure in building a US business, which was exacerbated by recent press reports on spying by the US National Security Agency. Other large US technology companies like IBM and HP also reported recent weakness in China and Qualcomm has made public comments that U.S. restrictions on Chinese companies and revelations about surveillance by the NSA are impacting its business in China.  As a result of these and other recent data points, there is now a growing view on Wall Street that US tech firms are seeing slowing sales in China due to the NSA spying claims. It is interesting, however, that Franco-American company Alcatel-Lucent announced the day after Cisco report its poor China results that it had won the largest market share in China Mobile’s network for Enhanced Packet Core (EPC) technology among all vendors (including Chinese based vendors). Alcatel-Lucent sells in China through a joint venture established in 1984. Perhaps Alcatel-Lucent is not feeling the same issues as other large US technology firms because it is technically a French company, but it’s long standing JV and the relationships established by this JV in China also has likely played a role in its ability to so far overcome the political backlash that other large US technology companies have experienced.

 

While China based Internet companies like Baidu (search engine), Alibaba (e-commerce) and Tencent (social media and gaming), have generally become dominant in their home market, China based IT centric companies Huawei and Lenovo have established global businesses which have led to weakening fundamentals for Western suppliers of communications equipment and personal computers.  Huawei generated sales of $35.4 billion in 2012 and is now comparable in size to Western leaders Ericsson and Cisco.  The dramatic success of Huawei over the past fifteen years contributed to the bankruptcy of Nortel, the failed mergers of Alcatel with Lucent and Nokia with Siemens, and the lackluster stock performance of Ericsson and Cisco.  Lenovo became the world’s largest supplier of personal computers in 2Q13 with both IDC and Gartner estimating their market share at 16.7% surpassing both HP and Dell for the first time.  In 2009, Lenovo ranked fourth in the world in PC shipments with about 7% share.  While HP and Dell continue to suffer from the fundamental shift from PCs to tablets and smartphones, the loss of market share to Lenovo over the past few years intensified this fundamental issue for both companies and was likely a contributing factor to Dell deciding to go private through an LBO to realign the company and pursue a more Enterprise IT and Services strategy.

 

While US Internet companies and global IT equipment suppliers such as Microsoft, Cisco, HP and others have had either difficulties succeeding in the China market, or face significant competitive pressures from China based IT global competitors such as Huawei and Lenovo, there are examples of US technology companies that have succeeded in selling in China and competing globally against Chinese based competitors over an extended period of time and who so far, have not publicly acknowledged any political pressure on their respective businesses.  Two such companies are Apple and Corning.  Apple currently generates about 15% of total sales from Greater China and its operating margin in China is generally comparable with other regions.  This level of success has been achieved with Apple not yet selling iPhones to China Mobile, the largest mobile operator in the world based on subscribers.  Apple has also been vocal and active on improving working conditions in China among its supply chain companies including conducting annual audits on its suppliers; thus, thus likely helping its reputation in the country.  Corning has been in China for 25 years and competes effectively in catalytic converter substrates, LCD glass display and fiber optic cable.  The Greater China Region represents 26% of Corning total sales and is the company’s largest country by annual sales.  Corning attributes it success in China to having a very long-term perspective, developing relationships with key leaders at the local and national level on important issues such as IP protection, investing in local manufacturing and developing extra checks and balances on potential IP protection issues. 

 

While there is no magic formula for succeeding in the China market as a technology company, there are some common threads among companies that have shown success in the market.  These include, truly showing (not saying) a long-term commitment to the country, developing key relationships (including JVs) at the local and national level to help support a fair playing field and protection of IP, local manufacturing through long lived assets and R&D, understanding the risks of reputational damage when taking legal or other public action against a local company and enacting unique processes to help ensure IP is maintained.  Having products or a distribution of products that make pirating or copying of your products difficult, is also a big plus.

 

Note: The above article first appeared in the November 2013 issue of “The Cornerstone Journal of Sustainable Finance & BankingSM

 

Activist Investing In The Technology Sector

Recent earnings reports from technology powerhouses of the past couple of decades exemplify that these prior titans are all now challenged by lack of revenue growth, margin compression and/or disruptions from new technologies. In particular, Cisco, Dell, IBM, Intel, HP, Microsoft and Oracle all either suffered from weak revenue and/or margin results in their most recent respective earnings results.  Perhaps the confluence of weak results was coincident with the lack of global GDP growth and indicative that these large companies are all suffering from the “law of large numbers” as they have all become mature companies with exposure to legacy businesses (e.g. personal computers, Ethernet switching and structured relational databases etc.) that they all helped define and conquer in the prior three decades?  If true, however, the boards of these companies have to be cognizant of increasing shareholder activism in the technology industry and that more shareholder friendly actions in the form of increased capital returns to shareholders, potential company breakups and leadership changes will need to be considered in addition to traditional technology management actions such as using M&A to spur growth.   The fall from grace of HP prior to Meg Whitman being named CEO was unfortunately an example of a poor use of company cash for M&A, lack of internal investment for innovation and leadership selection choices and raises the question on whether an earlier action by an activist would have helped HP and its board make better decisions.

Recent successes of shareholder activism, which were not originally supported by company boards in large and “legacy” technology companies, have often led to favorable shareholder returns.  Such positive stock returns, will likely encourage further activism in my view from not only the traditional activists but from traditional “long only” investment funds.  The positive returns for shareholders in other “legacy” technology companies Motorola, Yahoo and Dell where activists became involved and ultimately led to a company breakup for Motorola, new leadership for Yahoo and a higher acquisition price for Dell in its planned LBO all resulted in favorable returns for shareholders.  Carl Icahn’s recent tweets regarding his recent investment in Apple, the largest technology company as measured by market capitalization, and discussions with Apple CEO Tim Cook regarding increasing capital returns for shareholders is further evidence of activism taking on the cash rich nature and relatively low valuation of large technology companies.

The recent case of Microsoft is also telling in regard to increased activism playing a role in leadership selection and potentially strategy change.  The fact that Microsoft is currently the third largest technology company in the world based on market capitalization, is not deterring activism from playing a role at this critical point in the company’s history.  In August of 2013, Microsoft offered a board seat to activist investor fund ValueAct Capital Management that had been pressing for a change of the CEO of company.  I also recall a few occasions during my career as a technology sell side analyst visiting institutional investor accounts around the same time as Steve Ballmer, CEO of Microsoft.  I found it interesting that investors would tell me how they made it a point to tell Mr. Ballmer that Microsoft needed to consider selling or exiting certain businesses, breaking up the company or other actions to enhance shareholder returns, but that such requests were falling on deaf ears.  When it was announced that Steve Ballmer would retire from Microsoft on August 23rd, Microsoft’s market capitalization rose by ~$20 billion.  After the announcement on September 2nd that Microsoft would acquire Nokia’s Device and Services business, thus doubling down on its current strategy even as a new CEO was not yet identified, Microsoft shares gave up about $13 billion in market capitalization.

Investors not only saw the Nokia acquisition as doubling down on the prior strategy, but at the time also the increased likelihood that Stephen Elop, current Nokia CEO and former executive at Microsoft, would be the next CEO of Microsoft and potentially maintain the status quo of Steve Ballmer’s tenure.  The opportunity to be heard and play a role in the future of Microsoft, however, was not going to be lost as shareholder activism led to several of Microsoft’s largest shareholders are putting pressure on the board of Microsoft to consider a CEO with “turn around” experience rather than someone who is going to just maintain the status quo.  It will certainly be interesting to see how the CEO selection of Microsoft develops and how activism will likely play a role in the CEP selection as well as the potential ongoing strategy post the selection.  The recent rally in Microsoft stock to a new 10 year high is a likely a sign that investors “smell” a positive leadership change, that will unlock value at the company.

Note: The basis for this article was originally published in the inaugural issue of the “Cornerstone Journal of Sustainable Finance and Banking” published in October 2013.

I also recently was interviewed on Bloomberg TV on the topic of Activism in The Technology Sector.  The interviewed can be viewed here

Does The Dell LBO Tell Us Anything About HP?

HP has been a horrendous stock in the past two years.  In my view this was due to weak fundamentals in the PC market, poor management decisions on acquisitions and a weak board of directors.  However, HP is still a company with annual revenues off about $120 billion making it one of the largest companies in the market.  HP is not going to disappear, and with some better management decisions and perhaps a better IT spending environment, it could be an interesting turnaround story.  It could, however, also be a value trap that continues to have its stock price decline.  I think HP is more likely to be a good stock performer than a value trap in the next year.  I base this on very negative sentiment and compelling valuation that is only supported by the recently announced LBO of Dell.

Below is a table showing the relative makeup of both Dell and HP.  Since each company segments it’s revenues  differently than the other, I made some assumptions in formulating this competitive table.  A more precise comparative analysis could be performed dissecting SEC filings.
 
                                                         HP  Dell
 Printing or Peripherals                   20%  16%
 PCs/Devices                                  29%  52%
 Services                                          28%  14%
 Servers Storage and Networking  17%  17%
Other                                                 6%  0%
As the table shows, Dell and HP have similar revenue compositions.  In addition, both companies have similar gross margins in the 20s and recent revenue trends of flat to declining revenues year over year.   In a sense, Dell is a smaller version of HP, without the management and board issues. The smaller size and market capitalization of Dell made an LBO possible, while an HP LBO is very unlikely.  Even though HP is not a LBO candidate like Dell, I think looking at the Dell valuation metrics at the LBO takeover price can provide insight into whether HP offers any value to investors.
 
The table below shows recent valuation metrics for HP and Dell.  As the the table shows, HP is a cheaper stock on EV/EBITDA and Price/Book while Dell is a bit cheaper on EV/Sales.  Since value investors tend to be more focused on cash flow metrics like EV/EVITDA and book value of the company, HP trades at a cheaper valuation than Dell.  While HP shareholders will not benefit from a potential LBO, any additional missteps from the current management team could lead to increased activism among shareholders forcing a change of strategy, management team, company break up or some other favorable catalyst for the stock.  If the current management team executes better, the low valuation should provide a base from which the stock can appreciate.  
 
                      HPQ  DELL
 Price/Book  1.47  2.34
 EV/EBITDA  3.40  4.86
 EV/Sales      0.47  0.37
 
Another important point I would like to make is the trend in free cash flow at HP.  HP has tended to deliver consistent free cash flow (defined as cash flow from operations less capital spending) on the order of $2 billion a quarter or about $8 billion a year.  I believe recent negative reports from tech companies exposed to HP as either an OEM, EMS or reseller (e.g. Mellanox) is reflective of HP trying to manage its cash flow to continue to show solid performance on this important financial metric.
 
Finally, the sentiment on HP is extremely negative on the street. Currently, there are only the equivalent of 2 buy ratings vs. 23 neutral ratings and 9 sell ratings.  The sell side clearly continues to view HP as a value trap given this composition of stock ratings.  Also, most IT executives I speak to view HP as a weak company with little prospects for any turnaround. This may end up being correct, but I think in this current age of increased shareholder activism, the recent Dell LBO and continued focus by HP on cash flow generation, HP is more of a Buy than a Sell.  Longer term, I am not yet convinced that HP will be a great stock or company, but in the short to intermediate term, I think the stock looks somewhat attractive.
 
Disclosure: I currently own shares of HP. I may currently or in the future solicit any company mentioned in this report for consulting services for NT Advisors LLC. 

 

SDN: Open, Fragmented Chaos

I wanted to follow up on a prior blog post after attending a recent SDN conference where I also moderated an investment panel.  In summary, I walked away from this conference and reading other recent SDN news thinking that 2013 will be a year of increased entropy for the SDN market.  VCs will continue to fund new start-ups, incumbent large IT companies will announce SDN plans/roadmaps, users will demand open standards to avoid vendor lock-in and the press release and marketing onslaught will be intense.  From an investment perspective, I still think it is too early to make any definitive conclusions given all this disorder and timing of SDN revenues being significant still being a couple of years away, but I believe that existing merchant silicon suppliers like Broadcom can only benefit from the deployment SDN with little threats from start-ups, while Layer 4-7 based appliance companies like F5 are most at risk given the ultimate SDN architecture and significant VC start-up funding in this area. 

Users Want Open Standards: Not surprising, both enterprise and service provider end users are weary of being locked-in to single vendor or vendor coalitions. After all, one of the main goals of SDN is to unlock monolithic data center hardware and appliances to allow for more innovative and faster feature development.  What I think will be challenging here is any standards efforts typically involves multiple constituents with different agendas.  This tends to slow down the standards process and results in compromises in the ultimate standards that limit functionality and flexibility.  A very relevant example in the recent past was the standardization process for IP Multi-media Subsystem (IMS) in the telecommunications industry.   When I asked a senior technical executive from the telecom industry at the SDN conference on whether there were any lessons learned or best practices from the IMS standardization process that could be applied to SDN, the answer was not encouraging. Specifically, the executive mentioned how the standards process around IMS was tedious, took longer than expected, and resulted in compromises that ultimately left the standard somewhat inflexible for some future unforeseen requirements (e.g. certain aspects of machine to machine communications over 3G/4G wireless networks).   Although not yet formally announced, the new open-source Daylight controller consortium from traditional networking and IT vendors Cisco, Citrix, HP, IBM and NEC will be interesting to watch.  Is this is a true open-source initiative, or a coalition effort from those that benefit from the current processes in data center design, implementation and hardware sales that just want to keep the status quo as we transition to SDN over the next few years.

Fragmentation and Chaos: To me, the SDN market right now is both fragmented in terms of company functionality and chaotic in terms of vendor positioning and marketing.  I say fragmented as most start-ups (and public companies for that matter) I see are offering one or a few pieces of the overall SDN solution, but not one is all that encompassing. That make sense given how broad SDN is both in terms of architecture and functionality.  It is likely we will see continued funding of start-ups to fill in functions within the SDN functional grid as well as acquisitions as existing public companies and mature SDN start-ups seek to fill out their SDN offerings.  The F5 acquisition of LineRate was a recent example of this as an existing appliance based Application Delivery Controller company F5, acquired an SDN start-up focused on Application Delivery Control.  Thus, the fragmentation of the SDN market is likely to remain and supportive of continued VC funding, which will continue to fuel consolidation as mature start-ups, traditional networking, hardware and software companies seek to fill in the gaps of their SDN solution.  I continue to believe such a cycle and the ultimate timing of significant SDN revenues being 3 years away will make it highly unlikely any true SDN start-up goes public in the next two years.

I also characterize the SDN market as chaotic right now given the marketing onslaught of large technology companies in 2013.  In the past several days alone, we have seen initial indications of the open-source Daylight controller (e.g. expected to be supported by Cisco, Citrix, HP, IBM and NEC), SDN announcements from traditional vendors Ericsson and Huawei and ONUG releasing its top five recommendations to enable Open Networking.   While 2012 was the year start-ups garnered virtually all the attention in the SDN market, 2013 seems to be the year that technology incumbents are scrambling for mind share through coalitions, product launches/roadmaps and acquisitions.  On top of these developments, venture capitalists on the panel I moderated at the SDN conference indicated they expect further investments in 2013 for new SDN start-ups.   Seems like the SDN crescendo will only intensify throughout the year.

Investment Thoughts:  My investment thesis around SDN continues to evolve as I continue to digest new information.  I provide some takeaways from the investment panel I moderated at the SDN conference below, which are of-course subject to change in the future as new information becomes available.   

  1. Little Competition for Merchant Silicon Companies: Everyone agrees that there will be strong demand for merchant silicon for new hardware platforms as the SDN market develops.  On the other hand, it appears VCs do not want to fund merchant silicon start-ups given the high R&D and other costs associated with semiconductor companies vs. software companies.  Thus, my conclusion is that Broadcom and maybe Marvel (if they can get some traction with their merchant silicon products) could be companies to benefit from the growth of SDN, although it will take a few years for SDN to truly drive merchant silicon sales. Intel would be another beneficiary, but merchant silicon would likely be too small of a business for such a large semiconductor company.
  2. Layer 4-7 Companies More At Risk Than Cisco: While all incumbent data center equipment suppliers are potentially at risk from the future of SDN, I think special purpose appliance based Layer 4-7 companies like F5 are more vulnerable than Cisco.   I say this because the ultimate SDN architecture will still require physical switching fabrics in the data center. Perhaps these fabrics will be merchant silicon based and Cisco will suffer share loss or margin pressure, but perhaps not.  On the other hand, the stand alone Layer 4-7 appliance is not present in the future SDN based data center, but rather replaced by a pure software solution in the application layer.  While its possible companies like F5 can pivot and transition their business models to be the suppliers of such software, the VC community seems intent on funding talented start-ups to attack this technology discontinuity while at the same time they are not funding merchant silicon companies at all and seem to be rarely funding data center fabric companies. 

Disclosure: I currently own shares of Cisco, HP, Marvel and Ericsson mentioned in this report. I may currently or in the future solicit any company mentioned in this report for consulting services for NT Advisors LLC.

Oracle and Cisco On A Collision Course

Today Oracle announced it was acquiring session border controller equipment supplier Acme Packet for about $1.7 billion.   Acme Packet has roughly 50% market share of the $500 million session border controller market.  What I find interesting in this strategic move by Oracle is that they are entering a market (albeit a relatively small market) that is served by traditional communications equipment suppliers like Cisco, Alcatel-Lucent and Ericsson.  One has to ask, why is Oracle entering such a market?  My view on this is Oracle sees that the combination of high speed public roaming wireless technologies like LTE, the maturation of IP Multi-Media System (IMS) for IP service manageability (which SBC is a part of), more sophisticated mobile devices (e.g. tablets and smartphones) and cloud hosting as allowing for the first time communications service providers (e.g. Verizon and AT&T) to truly offer a full suite of managed fixed and mobile services to the enterprise customers.    Oracle wants to be a solution provider to service providers and large enterprises in the areas of business/services operations, IMS core manageability and application creation elements.  Oracle already does a significant amount of business with service providers in business/services operations and is likely looking to expand its offering in IMS core and application creation.  Acme fits into the IMS core.  I would not be surprised to see Oracle acquire Layer 4-7 application companies within the Software Defined Networking (SDN) architecture as well to enhance their offerings in application creation.  These companies, however, may not necessarily be public companies, but rather private start-ups developing pure software applications rather than special purpose network appliances.

What is also clear to me in this move by Oracle is how Cisco and Oracle will become more competitive over time. This is not surprising, as both companies are somewhat mature and seeking new growth vehicles.  What probably also accelerates this increasing competition between the two companies is Cisco’s recent strategy shift to being more of a software company.  Acme was a main competitor to Cisco, albeit in a small market of only about $500 million.  Even so, this deal likely portends of more competitive clashes between the two companies in the future.  So while the street has been focused on the increasing competitive dynamics between EMC and Cisco after VMware acquired Nicira back in July of 2012, now we can add another competitive battle with Cisco in the form of Oracle.

Large cap technology companies like IBM, Oracle, Cisco, EMC and HP all are mature when one looks at single digit organic revenue growth or even less for IBM and HP.  We are likely to see more of these technology titans continue to compete with each other as we have already seen in the past several years.   Even though this is obvious, predicting the actual M&A decisions by each company has not always been so obvious.  While VMware acquiring Nicira was not too shocking, I don’t think many were predicting Oracle would buy Acme Packet.  More such surprises are likely in 2013 and beyond to the point one has to question how the networking equipment industry landscape will look like in a few years.

Disclosure:  I currently own shares of Cisco and Ericsson mentioned in this blog post.  NT Advisors LLC may currently or in the future solicit any company mentioned in this blog post for consulting/advisory services.

Return of the Telecom Jedi?

I continue to be positive on large telecom equipment suppliers Ericsson and Alcatel-Lucent.  The main premise behind my positive view is the telecom infrastructure industry is a cyclical industry, and we are likely to see a recovery of capital spending by telecom operators in 2013. This recovery in telecom spending, combined with relatively low valuations for equipment companies like Ericsson and Alcatel-Lucent, should allow these stocks to have good relative performance in 1H 2013.

In addition to this primary thesis on these stocks, I also point to two other recent data points.  First, the strong recent operating results and profits by the telecom equipment infrastructure business at Nokia Siemens Networks (NSN).  As mentioned on a prior blog post, NSN has reported better than expected profit margins in the past three quarters and seems to be executing well on its restructuring plan.  Secondly, I believe the momentum of Chinese based equipment suppliers Huawei and ZTE is diminishing (at least for now), which should bode well for Alcatel-Lucent, Ericsson and others.  This is an important point as Huawei and ZTE have been massive market share gainers and price setters in the telecom infrastructure market over the past decade, which negatively impacted the entire sector.

Both Huawei and ZTE provided financial updates on their 2012 results in the past couple of weeks, which showed slowing momentum in terms of further market share gains and achieving their respective 2012 revenue targets.  According to the Financial Times, Huawei announced in January revenues of about $35 billion for 2012, but that was below the Huawei target of $38.7 billion it was discussing as late as September of 2012.   Over the past couple of years, Huawei has been seeking to achieve its long-term growth targets by entering the new markets of Enterprise Networking and Mobile Devices.  While the company seems to be doing well in Mobile Devices at the low end of the market, Huawei does not seem to be hitting its targets in the Enterprise Networking market.  These new efforts are also spreading the company thin in my view and puts Huawei on a multi-front competitive battle with Cisco and HP in enterprise networking, Samsung in mobile devices in addition to traditional competitors like Alcatel-Lucent, Ericsson and NSN in telecom infrastructure.

As for ZTE, the company pre-announced lower than expected results for 4Q12 last week.  Not only were the results lower than expected, but also some equity research analysts now believe ZTE’s market share gains in the international telecom equipment market have stalled.  Below is an exert from a research report on this topic from UBS Investment Research:

“After large-scale staff layoffs and the closure of a few representative offices in

overseas markets, we believe ZTE’s growth in the overseas equipment segment

will slow significantly. Our channel checks suggest the pipeline for new

contracts is limited. In the longer term, we believe ZTE’s withdrawal from some

developed markets means the prospect of ZTE gaining a top-three role as a

global equipment vendor by overtaking Nokia Siemens Networks (NSN) and

Alcatel-Lucent has become quite slim.”

Source: UBS Investment Research Report Dated 1/28/13

 

Disclosure:  I currently own shares of Alcatel-Lucent, Ericsson, HP and Cisco all of which are mentioned in this report.  I also may solicit any company mentioned in this report as a potential consulting client for NT Advisors LLC.

 

 

 

 

I Continue To Be Positive On Technology for 2013

Following up on my blog post in the beginning of the year, I continue to expect the technology sector to outperform the overall market (S&P 500) in 2013.  This opinion is based on three years of underperformance of the technology sector given a depressed level of telecom and enterprise capital spending which has compressed valuations for technology stocks vs. other sectors like consumer discretionary which as been a strong relative performer over that three year period.  I continue to believe we will have some recovery on capital spending in both telecom and enterprise networks in 2013, which together with lower relative valuations, should allow the technology sector to outperform in 2013.

So far in 2013, the technology sector is up around 4.5% vs. the 2.5% return of the S&P 500.  While it is still very early in the year, this initial outperformance and strong stock performance from IBM and Google (two large components in the technology sector index) today after their reporting their earnings (both are up about 5%-6% so far this morning) are very good signs.   The depressed level of technology stocks has also been supported by recent discussions in the press of Dell being a potential LBO candidate, and HP potentially being broken up to create shareholder value if the company does not show signs of a turnaround in 2013.

The biggest potential risk to technology outperforming in 2013 in my view is the performance of Apple as it makes up to 20% of technology index given its large market cap.  I am not particularly positive on Apple as it is losing momentum (see my prior blog post on Apple for more details) and does not play into the theme of recovering capital spending for technology stocks.  However, the stock has declined close to 30% off its high and is discounting many of the negative fundamentals I discussed in my earlier blog on the stock.

Disclosure:  I am currently not long or short any stock mentioned in this blog post (i.e. Apple, IBM, Google, Dell or HP).  I also do not plan on taking a position on any of these stocks in the next couple of days.  I am long the technology ETF ticker VGT.

Addendum – With the selloff in tech shares today 1/24/13, I am considering purchasing shares in technology stocks mentioned in this post.

Cisco Wants To Be #1 – Déjà Vu All Over Again

Cisco held its annual financial conference on December 7th and as expected, the company outlined its new plan to become more of a software and services company. I wrote about this twist on Cisco’s strategy on my blog “Cisco Pulling an IBM?” on November 19th.   While Cisco spent a good part of its analyst day talking about how it is best positioned to implement this new strategy, CEO John Chambers also put out the goal for Cisco to be the number one IT company in the world in the future.  What I found interesting about this statement is that Cisco first put this target out in the 2006-2007 timeframe in a prior financial analyst meeting.  At that time, Cisco had its “secret” spin-in Nuova developing the UCS blade server allowing Cisco to expand its addressable market within the IT industry from networking to also servers.  Cisco was also at that time initiating its entry into the consumer IT segment, which it later shutdown in 2011 post the failed 2009 acquisition of Flip maker Pure Digital.

Cisco backed off its aim to the be the number one IT company when the 2008/2009 recession led to a decline in Cisco revenues and earnings, and concern that HP was going to commoditize its traditional networking business hit the stock in 2010/2011.   Well now that the great recession is over and HP is viewed less likely to be a challenger to Cisco given the numerous problem the company is experiencing, John Chambers has re-launched the bold target to be number one.  In 2006/2007, Cisco had the expansion into servers and the data center market as its launch pad for being more than just a networking company.  Today, Cisco is using a more aggressive entry into software and services as the next frontiers for being number one.  Storage seems to remain an area of partnerships rather an acquisition for now, but that could change depending on what EMC decides to do in the future with regard to any broader efforts in the networking market.

In my view, Cisco is better positioned in the networking industry than it was a couple of years ago as primary large competitors HP, Huawei and Juniper are less of a threat.  HP has had many corporate issues and a failed overall strategy to date, Huawei’s success in entering the Enterprise market has shown little progress outside of China and Juniper is spread thin and faces niche competitors in addition to Cisco in areas such as security and switching.  The improved competitive standpoint in networking and a much stronger commitment to capital returns to shareholders via a higher dividend yield than the past has make Cisco stock a safer place to be these days than the past three years.

While Cisco stock may be safer today than in the past three years, I think its still a long shot for Cisco to fulfill the number one IT company goal given IBM is basically already the de-facto number one IT company today with a strong suite of software and services, trust by corporate CIOs and a very focused and consistent strategy.  I don’t see IBM bowing to Cisco’s new goal to be number one.  In addition, other large traditional IT companies like Oracle and EMC and new challengers to the traditional IT model like Amazon, Apple and Google are all aiming to capture a larger share of corporate IT spending.  So until proven otherwise, Cisco’s claim that it wants to be number one in IT sounds like déjà vu all over again to me.  Given John Chambers is likely to retire within the next 3-4 years, the ultimate outcome of this goal is not even likely to be known when he departs after a long and successful role as CEO since 1995.